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S U M M A R Y
Background: Public–private mix (PPM), recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO), was
introduced to cope with the tuberculosis (TB) epidemic worldwide. In many developing countries, PPM
has played a powerful role in TB control, while in others it has failed to meet expectations. Thus we
performed a systematic review to determine the mechanisms used by global PPM programs
implemented in different countries and to evaluate their performance.
Methods: A comprehensive search of the current literature for original studies published up to May
2014 was done using electronic databases and online resources; these publications were then screened
using rigorous criteria. Descriptive information and evaluative outcomes data were extracted from
eligible studies for synthesis and analysis.
Results: A total of 78 eligible studies were included in the ﬁnal review. These assessed 48 PPM TB
programs worldwide, subsequently categorized into three mechanisms based on collaborative
characteristics: support, contract, and multi-partner group. Furthermore, we assessed the effectiveness
of PPM programs against six health system themes, including utilization of the directly observed
treatment strategy (DOTS), case detection, treatment outcomes, case management, costs, and access and
equity, under the different collaborative mechanisms. Analysis of the comparative studies suggested that
PPM could improve overall outcomes of a TB service, and multiple collaborative mechanisms may
signiﬁcantly promote case detection, treatment, referral, and service accessibility, especially in resource-
limited areas. However, the less positive outcomes of several programs indicated limited funding and
poor governance to be the predominant reasons.
Conclusions: PPM is a promising strategy to strengthen global TB care and control, but is affected by
contextual characteristics in different areas. The scaling-up of PPM should contain essential
commonalities, particularly substantial ﬁnancial support and continuous material input. Additionally,
it is important to improve program governance and training for the health providers involved, through
integrated collaborative mechanisms.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Infectious Diseases
jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / i j id1. Introduction
In 1994, the World Health Organization (WHO) initiated the
directly observed treatment short course (DOTS) strategy to
address the global tuberculosis (TB) epidemic. DOTS was primarily
implemented through National Tuberculosis Programs (NTPs).
However, in some resource-poor settings, many patients seek TB care
and treatment from providers that are not afﬁliated with the public* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: liuqin81622@163.com (Q. Liu).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2015.02.015
1201-9712/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).sector-based NTPs.1 In these cases, the private health sector is a key
health service provider and is viewed as a more accessible,
responsive, and individualized option for patients. In some develop-
ing countries, more than half of patients prefer to seek private
medical care. However, the private sector has often failed to provide
high-quality TB care, which NTPs are well positioned to deliver.2
Given the respective merits of public and private health care
providers, and recognizing that NTPs are crucial yet insufﬁcient to
fully advance TB care and control, a novel public–private mix
(PPM) approach was introduced in some developing countries
during the late 1990s. In 2003, given the initial success of the
approach, it was recommended that the PPM strategy involve allciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
X. Lei et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 34 (2015) 20–32 21relevant health care providers in TB care and control in order to
achieve the WHO proposed global targets of 70% case detection and
85% successful treatment.3,4 PPM is currently a core component of
the WHO STOP TB Strategy (2006–2015) to engage all public,
voluntary, corporate, and private providers in TB care and control.5
Further, PPM has become a common approach to address the
challenges of TB, malaria, and HIV/AIDS in vulnerable populations
and to improve the delivery of health and welfare services for a
wider range of health problems worldwide.6
Because PPM was generally considered to be a promising
strategy to expand DOTS, it was promptly introduced into TB
programs in countries with a high TB burden. Most research has
focused on PPM effectiveness, such as case notiﬁcation, treatment
outcomes, or patient burden, but little attention has been paid to
access to and equity of TB services, and little evidence has been
provided regarding the collaborative structures of the programs.7
Previous research has summarized the characteristics of PPM
programs in different countries. For example, Ullah et al. described
the unique roles and functions of particular organizations that
have facilitated successful PPM projects in Nepal (a local working
group that played a critical coordinating role), Indonesia (a medical
association that provided training), and the Philippines (a
government program that created policy and provided training
and drugs),8 and Lonnroth et al. compared the operating
procedures and effectiveness of PPMs in New Delhi, Ho Chi Minh
City, Nairobi, and Pune.9 However, these studies did not identify
general collaborative mechanisms to categorize existing PPM
programs.
Therefore, the present study was conducted to (1) systemati-
cally address global PPM TB programs and summarize the
collaborative mechanisms of the PPM strategy according to
characteristics and internal links among the health providers
involved, and (2) comprehensively evaluate the performance of
PPMs in aspects of case detection, treatment outcome, case
management, costs, access, and equity.
2. Methods
2.1. Deﬁnitions
The deﬁnitions used in this study for public health sector,
private health sector, non-governmental organization (NGO), and
PPM are given in the Supplementary Material (Table S1), and are
in accordance with those used in WHO reports and previous
research.5,8,10–16
2.2. Search strategy
A systematic search of the literature published prior to May 30,
2014 was performed in 14 electronic databases, two gray literature
databases, and the records of six relevant websites; details of the
search strategy are given in the Supplementary Material
(Table S2). In addition, we reviewed conference abstracts,
commentaries, and reference lists of literature reviews to identify
further potential studies.
2.3. Selection criteria and data extraction
Two reviewers independently screened all retrieved studies
and extracted data from eligible studies; any disagreements were
resolved by discussion, and consensus was reached for all items.
To summarize PPM mechanisms, we included studies that
clearly described the partners involved and the collaborative form
of the PPM TB program; articles mentioning or comparing the
public and private TB institutions but not referring to their
collaboration were excluded. With regard to the assessment ofPPM performance, we included the following: (1) studies
evaluating the outcomes of the implementation of PPM programs
with comparisons, and (2) experimental study types (randomized
controlled trials (RCTs), cluster RCTs, controlled before and after
studies (CBAs), cluster controlled trials) and observational studies
(longitudinal surveys, cross-sectional studies). Studies on TB
diagnosis tools, drug development, and vaccination, and review,
commentary, letter, news, editorial, bibliography, and meeting
brief publication types were excluded.
The following data were extracted: publication information,
description of the study country and district, PPM implementation
conditions, study type, and PPM content.
2.4. Data analysis
The PPM studies included were sorted according to the location
of implementation, time period, intervention subjects, and health
sectors involved, and then into three main collaboration mecha-
nisms – supporting, contracting, and multi-partner group,
according to the roles, responsibilities, and collaborative char-
acteristics of the partners involved. Subsequently we evaluated the
performance of the PPM strategy against three collaboration
mechanisms and six health system themes (see Table 1), which
were established based on the 2000 World Health Report, the PPM
toolkit, and the targets for global TB control.3,17,18
3. Results
The process of study selection is shown in Figure 1 (according to
the 2009 PRISMA statement).19 Seventy-eight studies met the
selection criteria.20–97 Table 2 provides summary statistics for the
studies included.
3.1. Characteristics of PPM programs
As shown in Table 3, the 78 studies included assessed
48 existing PPM TB programs in 16 countries, most of which are
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Figure 2 shows the
global distribution of the PPM programs included. (For a general
description of these PPM programs, see the Supplementary
Material, Table S3.)
3.2. Summary of PPM practice mechanisms
We found that the PPM programs had several common
characteristics (as shown in Figure 3). Government institutions
initiate the NTP and assume responsibility for policy and guideline
development and planning, as well as program ﬁnancing and the
provision of anti-TB drugs, facilities, and other supplies. Private
health institutions or individual practitioners detect suspected
cases and then either refer cases to the NTP-afﬁliated facilities for
treatment, or notify the NTP by recording results in the laboratory
register and provide TB care themselves. Public health institutions,
such as public TB centers and public general hospitals, receive
referral cases and conﬁrm the diagnosis, and then provide further
treatment or send patients back to local private providers for
treatment and management. NGOs are often engaged in mobilizing
and coordinating health partners, and sometimes in performing
partial TB care work; some PPMs also involve academic institutions
for staff training, patient health education, technical assistance, and
outcome evaluation. Table 4 presents the Philippines example to
specify the roles and responsibilities of partners involved in a PPM.
In practice, mutual assistance was found to exist between the
sectors involved, whatever their roles and function in PPM
collaboration. Therefore, we deﬁned ‘support mechanism’ as the
public or private sector providing particular support to the other in
Table 1
Program assessment themes: evaluation categories, subcategories, and indicators used
Program evaluation
category
Subcategory Description and indicators
DOTS utilization DOTS coverage
Adherence to DOTS
guidelines
Proportion of catchment population reached by DOTS; proportion of conﬁrmed TB cases treated under DOTS
Proportion of physicians who obey the standard TB guidelines when providing diagnosis and anti-TB treatment
Case detection Detection and diagnosis
of infectious cases
Rates of newly notiﬁed TB cases, including new smear-positive cases and new active TB cases, normally
expressed as a percentage
Treatment outcomes Treatment success When a sputum smear-positive patient completes treatment and is cured (becomes smear-negative) or when a
smear-negative patient completes treatment, indicated by rates of treatment completion and cure
Default Rate of patients who quit treatment for any reason
Relapse Rate of cured TB patients who are re-diagnosed as smear-positive
Mortality Rate of death among TB patients, controlling for population characteristics
Case management Transfer and referral Patients transferred from involved partners to NTP TB facilities, indicated by rates of case referral
Report and registration TB cases reported, registered, and recorded by different health sector partners through particular systems
Follow-up and tracing Rates of treated patients under the observation and follow-up of health care providers; activities on tracing
defaulters who quit during either the referral or treatment process
Costs Patient fees Direct costs like expenditure on TB care and transportation; additional fees for consultation, diagnostic tests,
and adjuvant therapy; under-the-table charges like work delays and income loss; cost-effectiveness
Operating fees Costs for the operation and management of health sectors, including costs for service provision, initiating
activities, salaries, incentives, use of facilities, and consumption of materials
Access and equity Availability Distance/hours to facility, transportation status, and waiting time for service
Affordability Blocks to TB care because of the socio-economic proﬁle of patients; free diagnosis and drugs supplied by NTP;
reimbursement and refunding for covering TB care costs
Appropriateness Health services meet the needs of the population, and especially those in most need
Acceptability Patients feel culturally safe and satisﬁed with TB care
DOTS, directly observed treatment short course; TB, tuberculosis; NTP, National Tuberculosis Program.
X. Lei et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 34 (2015) 20–3222a PPM program. This can be further categorized into three types
(see Figure 4): (1) ‘Financial support’: this refers to partners
(usually NTP institutions) directly providing money to run the PPM
program, covering spending for material purchase, staff wages,
travel expenditure, infrastructure expenditure, and other costsFigure 1. Flow diagramgenerated during the PPM process. National or international
donors, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (GFATM), have covered most, if not all, of these costs;
programs can also be funded in part by charities, medical
organizations, or companies. Grants awarded for PPM operations of study selection.
Table 2
Characteristics of the studies included
Characteristics Asia and Paciﬁc Africa Latin America North America Total Number
Study publication year
1990–1999 7 0 0 2 9
2000–2009 53 7 1 2 63
2010–2013 6 0 0 0 6
Study purpose
To describe the collaborative approach and roles of involved health sectors 53 8 1 4 66
To assess program performance 52 7 1 4 64
Types of facility involved
NTP or RNTCP 46 4 1 0 51
Government and administration sectors 25 4 0 2 31
Public TB sectors 18 3 0 2 23
Hospitals, clinics, and laboratories 17 3 0 1 21
Pharmacies and individual health care providers 16 3 1 0 20
NGOs 31 7 1 1 40
Enterprises and companies 2 1 0 1 4
Disease category
Pulmonary TB 55 7 1 4 67
MDR-TB 6 0 0 1 7
TB/HIV 5 0 0 0 5
Total numbers of studies 66 7 1 4 78
NTP, National Tuberculosis Program; RNTCP, Revised National Tuberculosis Control Program; TB, tuberculosis; NGO, non-governmental organization; MDR, multidrug-
resistant.
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governments. (2) ‘Material supply’: this refers to the supply of
free anti-TB drugs, microscopes, and other essential goods, tools, or
equipment by the NTP to the health sector involved in PPM
(especially private sector or private practitioners). Sometimes
private enterprise or pharmaceutical companies also supply
patients with drugs, electronic boxes, or transportation vehicles.
(3) ‘Technical support’: this refers to training/workshops to
improve awareness, knowledge, and the technical capacity of TB
physicians, especially for private practitioners who have failed to
follow NTP medical care guidelines; it also involves directly
designating skilled professionals from NTP institutions, NGOs, and
academic institutions to participate in practical work, or to provide
technical guidance to less experienced TB service providers.
Support mechanisms are widespread among most PPM
programs, and in addition, some programs have also introduced
elements to reinforce the collaboration, therefore forming another
two collaborative mechanisms: the contracting mechanism and
the multi-partner group mechanism.
Contracting is deﬁned as ‘‘a voluntary alliance between
independent partners who accept reciprocal duties and obligations
and who expect to beneﬁt from their relationship’’.98 A standard
contract deﬁnes in detail the mutual responsibilities of contractual
partners, the ﬁnancial conditions, and the legal implications of
breach.99 Under a contracting mechanism, the institutions
involved are able to reach a consensus and formally or informally
agree on their roles and duties. A formal contract represents an
agreement voluntarily established between public institutions
(mostly government/NTP sectors) and private institutions (mostly
NGOs) through a written legal obligation; the most common form
used has been the memorandum of understanding (MoU), which
speciﬁes the detailed work of the institutions involved. An informal
contract usually refers to the private medical providers who give a
verbal guarantee to work in the collaboration, without formal
written documents (see Figure 5).
The multi-partner group mechanism mainly relates to a
working committee, which is a multi-sector group consisting of
representatives from core partners in PPM, such as government/
NTP institutions, TB service sectors, public/private hospitals,
individual practitioners, academic institutions, and sometimes
patients and consumers. This group is independently responsible
for dealing with essential issues, such as project design, advocacy,coordination, decision-making, and process/result evaluation,
through regular discussion and communication for consensus, in
order to increase the proﬁt for all stakeholders (see Figure 6).
We sorted all of the PPM programs according to the support
mechanism, contract mechanism, and multi-partner group mech-
anism. As shown in Table 5, all of the PPM programs included had a
support mechanism, and 17 programs involved all types of support
(ﬁnancial, material, and technical support). Among the programs
engaging the contract mechanism, 10 had signed a formal contract
and seven had a MoU. Twelve programs had established a multi-
partner group to ensure PPM implementation.
3.3. Performance assessment
A total of 64 studies assessed the outcomes of the PPM
programs, most of which were implemented between 2000 and
2009 (n = 51). More than half of these studies (n = 42) reported a
longitudinal study design, but most (n = 32) just performed a pre
and post comparison of the PPM intervention, and 25 studies had a
sample size of less than 500. Most studies were based on secondary
data from program records and documents (see Table 6 and
Supplementary Material, Table S4).
Program performance was analyzed against six health system
themes associated with different collaborative mechanisms. The
number of programs with positive outcomes is presented in
Table 7. Overall, PPM programs with a support mechanism
achieved fairly positive results; in particular, when contract
and/or multi-partner group mechanisms were introduced, case
detection, treatment outcomes, and case management were
promoted signiﬁcantly.
3.3.1. Theme 1. DOTS utilization
As a result of the PPM strategy, DOTS utilization was improved
in 31 programs. For example, DOTS was implemented nationwide
in India and Indonesia, as well as covering 90% of TB care facilities
in the Philippines and Bangladesh.
Most health care providers, both public and private, would
rather practice standard TB care when involved in a PPM. Their TB
knowledge and skills have been promoted through NTP advocacy
meetings and training courses. For example in New Delhi (IND-3),
the standard sputum test used for diagnosis and standard
treatment was adopted by almost all private practitioners, and
Table 3
Distribution of PPM programs included
Continent Region Country-ID Site Economic levela References
Asia South Asia India (IND)-1 Five main states Lower middle income 20, 21, 22, 23
India (IND)-2 Hyderabad 24, 25, 26
India (IND)-3 New Delhi 25, 27, 28, 29, 30
India (IND)-4 Mumbai 31, 32, 33, 34
India (IND)-5 Kerala 32, 35, 36, 37
India (IND)-6 Pune 27,
India (IND)-7 Chennai 27, 38
India (IND)-8 Meerut 39
India (IND)-9 Bangalore 27, 40, 41
India (IND)-10 Tiruvallur 42
India (IND)-11 Maharashtra 43, 44, 45
India (IND)-12 Nationwide 46
Nepal (NEP)-1 Kohalpur Low income 47
Nepal (NEP)-2 Lalitpur Municipality 48
Nepal (NEP)-3 Lalitpur 49, 50, 51
Bangladesh (BAN)-1 NA Low income 52
Bangladesh (BAN)-2 NA 53
Bangladesh (BAN)-3 NA 54
Bangladesh (BAN)-4 Dhaka, Chittagong, and Sylhet 55, 56
Pakistan (PAK)-1 Thatta, Sindh Lower middle income 57
Pakistan (PAK)-2 Karachi 58, 59
Pakistan (PAK)-3 Karachi 60
Pakistan (PAK)-4 NA 61
Southeast Asia Indonesia (INA)-1 Yogyakarta Lower middle income 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67
Indonesia (INA)-2 Yogyakarta 66
Indonesia (INA)-3 Central Java 62, 64, 68
Indonesia (INA)-4 Bali 62
Indonesia (INA)-5 West Sumatra 62
Indonesia (INA)-6 Timika 69
Myanmar (MYA)-1 Yangon Low income 70, 71
Myanmar (MYA)-2 Mandalay 72
Myanmar (MYA)-3 Pyay, Pyin Oolwin,
North Okkalapa
73
Vietnam (VIE) Ho Chi Minh City Lower middle income 74, 75, 76
Cambodia (CAM) Phnom Penh Low income 77
Philippines (PHI) NA Lower middle income 78, 79, 80, 81
East Asia China (CHN)-1 Shandong and Jiangsu provinces Upper middle income 82
China (CHN)-2 Shaanxi Province 83
Northeast Asia Korea (KOR) NA High income 84
Africa East Africa Kenya (KEN) Nairobi Low income 85
Southern Africa South Africa (RSA)-1 Cape Town Upper-middle-income 86
South Africa (RSA)-2 Free State, North West and Western Cape 87, 88, 89, 90
West Africa Nigeria (NGR)-1 Kaduna State Lower middle income 91
Nigeria (NGR)-2 Lagos State 92
Americas North America United States (USA)-1b Olmsted County, Minnesota High income 93
United States (USA)-2b Charleston, South Carolina
Shelter TB Program
94
United States (USA)-3b Pierce County, Washington 95
United States (USA)-4b New York City 96
South America Bolivia (BOL) Cochabamba Lower middle income 97
PPM, public–private mix; NA, not available.
a Economies are divided according to the 2012 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method: low income, $1035 or less; lower
middle income, $1036–$4085; upper middle income, $4086–$12 615; and high income, $12 616 or more.
b Except for Alaska.
X. Lei et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 34 (2015) 20–322489% of them wished to continue their association with the PPM
project; in Chennai (IND-7), monthly training materials helped
private practitioners to update their TB skills, and the proportion of
both X-ray and sputum testing increased from 19.1% to 59.3%,
while the use of X-ray alone decreased signiﬁcantly from 45.4% to
16.0%. However, in the Ho Chi Minh City (VIE) and Java (INA-2)
programs, private medical specialists and nurses rarely practiced
DOTS, despite their commitment to do so.
3.3.2. Theme 2. Case detection
A total of 41 studies on the PPM programs reported an increase
in the detection number or rate to some extent. The detection rates
for new smear-positive cases increased from 56% to 67% in Kerala
(IND-5), and from 24% to 32% in Bangladesh (BAN-2), even up to
70% in Hyderabad (IND-2) and Yogyakarta (INA-2). Studies
establishing control arms indicated that detection rates werehigher in the PPM setting. For example, in Ho Chi Minh City (VIE) the
increments of case detection were 18% in PPM districts and 0.4% in
control districts; and in New Delhi (IND-3) the newly notiﬁed TB
cases in PPM areas were nearly double those of control areas.
In some PPM programs, case detection increases have varied
depending on the health sectors involved. For example, in IND-13,
the health department facilities were found to have contributed to
an average of 67% new smear-positive notiﬁcation, followed by
medical colleges (16%), NGOs (7%), private practitioners (6%), and
other partners (4%); similarly in Bangalore (IND-9), medical
colleges contributed the most (56% of all notiﬁed cases).
3.3.3. Theme 3. Treatment outcomes
The overall treatment success rates in 39 programs were found
to have increased 60% following the introduction of the PPM
strategy, including treatment completion and cure of sputum
Figure 2. Countries with an implemented PPM presented in this review.
X. Lei et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 34 (2015) 20–32 25smear-positive cases. The cure rates in 18 programs reached 85%
(IND-2, 3, 4, IND-6, IND-9, 10, INA-1, 2, INA-6, MYA-2, 3, BAN-1, 3,
4, RSA-2, NEP-3, PHI, KOR, USA-1). Moreover, treatment outcomes
have often been better in PPM areas compared with control settings.
Taking Hyderabad (IND-2) for instance, health sectors in PPM-DOTS
successfully treated 40% more cases than the pure public sector and
85% more than the non-DOTS private sector; in Mandalay (MYA-2),
the treatment completion rate for the patient cohort was found to be
nearly 90%, signiﬁcantly higher than in the control townships. With
regard to the studies comparing different PPM interventions, for
example in the South Africa program (RSA-2), the treatment
completion rates and cure rates were generally lower in purely
public services than those in public–private workplace (PWP) and
public–private non-government (PNP) health clinics.
For different partners within one PPM program, the improve-
ments in treatment outcomes have varied. In the Kaduna State
(NGR) program, the cure rate in the public health sector was a little
better than in the private sector (64.1% vs. 60.9%), while the total
treatment sucess rate (including cure and completion cases) was a
lower (78.6% vs. 83.7%). However, in Meerut (IND-8), the treatment
outcomes did not differ between patients treated by NGO, private
hospital, or public DOTS sectors, although there was a general
increment in cured new smear-positive cases.Government 
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referral rate remained relatively low (around 30%), as the majority
of patients diagnosed in hospitals and chest clinics opted to stay
there for treatment.
Most PPM programs have established a report/registration
system (IND-1, 3, 5, INA-1, 2, 3, 4, NEP-3, MYA-3, PHI), in which
both public and private sectors are responsible for TB registration,
and the public sectors have often performed better.
Most programs have been reported to reinforce patient follow-
up (IND-3, 4, 5, INA-1, 2, 4, 6, NEP-3, USA-2, 3, MYA-3, PHI, NGR,
etc.). Sometimes the NTP or public TB sectors have also transferred
patients back to private providers for standard treatment and
better observation of patients (IND-4, INA-1, MYA-3, and NGR-1).
However, some PPM programs, like those in Vietnam and Central
Java (INA-3), have not ensured good case-holding, and an effective
approach has yet to be adapted to conﬁrm or supervise defaulters.
3.3.5. Theme 5. Costs
Comparative studies indicated that patients have spent less on
TB treatment in some PPM programs. For example, in Bangalore
(IND-9), the average cost per patient treated in the PPM involved
hospitals was much lower than in the non-PPM sectors (US$ 69 vs.
US$ 127), and the total societal costs decreased from 75% to 23%.
Similarly, in Hyderabad (IND-2) and Delhi (IND-3), the expenditure
for patients treated in the PPM private facilities was much lower
than in the non-PPM facilities (US$ 50 vs. US$ 111 and US$ 60 vs.
US$ 172, respectively). Even within the same PPM program (IND-
2), patients paid less for TB diagnosis and treatment in the private
sector than in the public sector (US$ 6 vs. US$ 31). With regard to
the comparison between different PPM interventions, the propor-
tion of average cost for purely public DOTS, the PWP model, and the
PNP model was approximately 3:2:1 in South Africa (RSA-2).
The lost income due to work delays was also reported in several
studies (IND-2, 9, INA-1, RSA-2). For example in Bangalore (IND-9),
the average number of days lost from work for patients after the
PPM intervention was greatly reduced (from 70 days to 30 days),
and at least half of lost wages (US$ 110) could be saved; similarly in
Hyderabad (IND-2), patients who visited the PPM private sector
lost less income for illness than those who visited other facilities
(45 days vs. 90 days of income lost).
However, patients have sometimes been charged additional
fees for consultations, diagnostic tests, and drugs to control
complications. In Yangon (MYA-1), private practitioners were
found to charge a consultation fee of US$ 0.30 for each visit. In
Vietnam, most patients were found to spend US$ 12 to US$ 33 per
month on herbal medicines or other home remedies to relieve
cough and fever.
Only 10 studies analyzed the cost-effectiveness of the PPM
strategy (IND-2, 3, 5, 9, INA-1, 3, 4, 5, RSA-2, MYA-1). In Kerala
(IND-5) and Bangalore (IND-9), the average cost per additional new
smear-positive patient diagnosed and successfully treated de-
creased signiﬁcantly during PPM for both providers and patients;
in the Western Cape (RSA-2), the most cost-effective partnership
was the PNP model with both a lower cost per patient and higher
treatment success rate.
The operational cost reported for the Washington program
(USA-3) was much lower after PPM implementation (US$ 379
200 vs. US$ 536 000). However, in the Kerala PPM program (IND-5),
the total annual cost for health facilities, including start-up costs
and implementation costs, varied between US$ 8712 and US$ 11
611, which was still high.
Some programs have provided ﬁnancial incentives to motivate
physicians, especially those in the private sector (INA-6, RSA-2,
BAN-1, CHN-2, PAK-1, 3, VIE, USA-1). For example in the South
Africa program, private practitioners were paid a minimum sum of
US$ 36 monthly for registration, diagnosis, and referral of each
NGOs 
Medi cal asso ciaons    
Private clini cs/ labs 
Private prac oners 
Public  hospi tal s/servic es 
Pub lic TB centers   
Naonal/in terna onal  funds   
Government 
(naonal/local): NTP 
Enterprises/companies   
Finan cial support   
Materials supply   
Technical hu man 
resource         
Figure 4. Schematic diagram of the support mechanism.
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physicians have made most of their proﬁt from consultation,
testing, or selling drugs (IND-5, 7, 10, INA-3, NEP-3, MYA-1, NGR-2,
PAK-2, KEN); this may increase the ﬁnancial burden for the patient.
3.3.6. Theme 6. Access and equity
In many programs, TB centers and laboratories are located in or
near poor areas to provide better access for indigent patients (IND-
2, 4, 6, 9, MYA-1, 2, 3, RSA-2, NEP-3, PAK-1). In some programs, the
TB facilities have also been set in relatively wealthier and
convenient locations to increase accessibility (PHI, KEN). Even in
some developed areas (Charleston of USA-2), the government has
established shelters for TB screening and the referral of homeless
and other relatively poor populations.
Free diagnosis and anti-TB medicines were found to have been
supplied by NTPs in almost all PPM programs, increasing the
affordability of TB care to a large extent. In addition, in someA. Formal contract  partn ership 
B. Informal c ontract partn ership 
Government 
(naonal/lo cal): NTP 
NGO   
Medi cal ass ociaon  
Private c lini cs/ labs 
Private prac oners 
Public  hospi tal s/servic es 
Pub lic T B centers   
Forma l contract
Government 
(naonal/lo cal): NTP 
NGO   
Medi cal ass ociaon  
Private c lini cs/ labs 
Private pracon ers
Informal  cont ract
Public  hospi tal s/ servic es 
Pub lic T B centers   
Figure 5. Schematic diagram of the formal/informal contract mechanism.programs like Bolivia and Nepal, the government has restricted the
private sale of TB medicines to ensure that patients are treated
under standard guidelines. Having said that, a low socio-economic
level may be a barrier to accessing TB care for some patients. For
example in Bangalore (IND-9) and Yangon (MYA-1), 50% and 60% of
patients were found to come from the lower wealth groups, and
the average treatment cost was equivalent to 53% and 68% of their
annual household income. Moreover in some programs (INA-1, 6,
BAN-2, RSA-2), patients have been encouraged to actively seek care
and complete treatment through reimbursement covering part of
their treatment and transport fees.
Some PPM program studies reported patient attitudes and care-
seeking behaviors to be changed through consultation and
education (IND-3, 7, 9, 12, RSA-1, CHN-2, MYA-1, NEP-3, USA-3).
For example in New Delhi (IND-3), patients expressed a high
degree of satisfaction with TB treatment, and 95.5% of patients
conﬁrmed receiving DOT medications; in Bangalore (IND-9) and
Lalitpur (NEP-3), patients acknowledged that PPM was useful and
expressed their willingness to visit appropriate health facilities
and to adhere to standard treatment. Additionally, in the Yangon
program (MYA-1), some newly diagnosed patients were motivated
by former patients to seek health services in PPM sectors.
4. Discussion
4.1. Interpretation and summary
TB remains a major challenge to global public health, and is
highly prevalent among LMICs.1 In order to ensure the practice of
DOTS, the WHO recommended the PPM strategy to engage all
health entities and practitioners in TB care and control in countriesGovernment 
(naonal/local): NTP 
NGO   
Medi cal ass ociaon  
Private clini cs/ labs 
Private prac oners 
Mul -partners group    
Public  hospi tal s/ servic es 
Pub lic TB centers   
Figure 6. Schematic diagram of the multi-partner group mechanism.
Table 5
Description of collaboration mechanisms for PPM programs included
Mechanism Number Country ID
Support mechanism 48 All
Financial support and material supply and technical resources 17 IND-1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12; INA-2, 3, 6; NEP-3; RSA-1, 2; PHI; MYA-2; BAN-2; PAK-1; USA-1
Financial support and material supply 2 IND-8; BAN-1
Financial support and technical resources 4 IND-11; INA-1; VIE; USA-2
Material supply and technical resources 11 IND-5; NEP-1, 2; MYA-1, 3; BAN-4; KEN; PAK-2, 3, 4; USA-4
Financial support 3 INA-4, 5; BAN-3
Material supply 3 IND-6; NGR-2; USA-3
Technical human resources 8 IND-7, 10; CHN-1, 2; NGR-1; CAM; BOL; KOR
Contract mechanism 15 IND-2, 3, 4, 5, 6; INA-1; NEP-3; RSA-2; PHI; MYA-1; BAN-1, 2; VIE; PAK-1; USA-3
Formal contract 10 IND-2, 3, 4, 5; INA-1; RSA-2; PHI; MYA-1; BAN-2; USA-3
Informal contract 5 IND-6; BAN-1; NEP-3; VIE; PAK-1
MoU 7 IND-2, 5; INA-1; RSA-2; PHI; MYA-1; BAN-2
Performance-based contract 6 IND-4, 5; RSA-2; BAN-1; PAK-1; VIE
Multi-partner group mechanism 12 IND-3, 4, 7; INA-1, 2, 3; NEP-2, 3; PHI; CHN-1; BAN-4; PAK-1
PPM, public–private mix; MoU, memorandum of understanding.
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countries of Global Fund-supported TB grants, 58 had implemen-
ted PPM activities up until 2009, and among these, at least 15 had
launched national PPM-DOTS programs.100,101 Even in some high-
income countries like the USA and South Korea, PPM has been
initiated to provide quality services to vulnerable populations such
as homeless people, multidrug-resistant (MDR)-TB patients, and
persons in other high-risk groups.84,95,96 In addition, the properties
of PPMs vary by area, due in part to the characteristics of local
medical care systems. Taking programs in China for example, the
local general hospitals involved are governed by health adminis-
trative departments although not fully funded by the NTP, hence
the collaboration between these hospitals and NTP institutions
(the local CDC) belongs to a public–public mix.83,92
The summary provided of the collaborative mechanisms is one
of the strengths of the present review. The support mechanism,
deﬁned as the basis of PPM collaboration, provides mutual support
to partners in terms of ﬁnancial, material, and technical aspects of
the program, regardless of which partner is assuming theTable 6
Characteristics of studies assessing effectiveness
Characteristics Study number
Study year range
1990–1999 10
2000–2009 51
2010–2014 3
Objectives of assessment
Assess the effectiveness of the PPM service 59
Assess the cost or cost-effectiveness of PPM 18
Study design
Longitudinal study 42
Cross-sectional study 22
Setting of controlsa
Compare PPM with non-PPM 20
Compare same PPM in different areas 9
Compare different PPM interventions 11
Compare public and private sectors in PPM 19
Pre and post comparison of the PPM intervention 32
Data resourceb
Secondary data collection 60
Field survey 35
Sample size of ﬁeld survey
500 25
500–1000 9
1000 4
NA 26
PPM, public–private mix; NA, not available.
a Some studies adopted more than one comparison.
b Data of some studies are from both facility documents and ﬁeld surveys.aforementioned roles. The support mechanism is thus seen as
an essential mechanism, because one of the major targets of the
PPM is to engage all possible service providers and help them to
provide qualiﬁed TB care.5 The support mechanism can be
completed by two other collaboration mechanisms, namely the
contract mechanism and the multi-partner group mechanism. In
the contract mechanism, the health sectors involved reach a formal
or informal contractual agreement on their respective duties. As
well as the common contract MoU, some programs have set a
performance-based contract (including the so-called ‘drugs-for-
performance contract’) in which the NTP promises to provide the
health care providers involved with a ﬁnancial subsidy and/or
continuous anti-TB medicines if they practice their obligations;
otherwise, NTP support will terminate.12 In the multi-partner
group mechanism, a working group is set up and members consist
not only of the representatives of PPM partners and stakeholders,
but also of indispensable third-parties. For example, the Green
Light Committee (GLC) was established by the WHO in 1999 for TB/
MDR-TB control and has participated in at least 10 PPM projects in
seven countries with local core partners.102
In practice, within a single PPM program, the three collabora-
tion mechanisms often combine simultaneously rather than
existing independently. Because of this comprehensive collabora-
tive approach, the duties of the partners involved can be more
explicit, while the inner links and mutual supervision can also be
enhanced, so that more favorable outcomes are attained.4,9 Our
ﬁndings of positive PPM outcomes with different mechanisms
provide the evidence that PPM programs adopting comprehensive
collaborative mechanisms may improve PPM performance, par-
ticularly with regard to patient detection, treatment, and
management. Nevertheless, the most useful collaboration mecha-
nism is difﬁcult to determine because the environments under
which the PPMs have been implemented vary greatly in terms of
economy, geography, demography, medical conditions, and local
TB prevalence.10,17
Although most programs have achieved the expected out-
comes, PPM is a complex health intervention that is not always
shown to be effective;5,48,74 for example, the less positive
outcomes in the Ho Chi Minh City program. Several determinants
of a successful PPM can be established based on the present study,
as outlined below.
(1) Financial cost is regarded as one of the crucial issues for the
PPM strategy. The PPM may be an effective intervention to possibly
improve quality of care, but it is not free;6,67 the running of a PPM
incurs large expenditure attributable to training, outreach efforts,
and grant-in-aid, therefore funds play an important role. According
to a WHO report, global grants for TB control have been increasing
Table 7
Number of programs with positive outcomes under different themes and mechanisms (n = 48)
Program assessment themes Support mechanism
only (n = 28)
Support plus contract
mechanism (n = 9)
Support plus multi-partner
group mechanism (n = 6)
Support plus contract and multi-partner
group mechanism (n = 5)
DOTS utilization 16 6 4 5
Case detection 24 8 4 5
Treatment outcomes 22 7 4 5
Case management 19 7 4 5
Accessibility/equity 15 6 2 5
Costs 7 5 2 4
DOTS, directly observed treatment short course.
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the proportion of PPM inputs has shown a decreasing trend.103,104
This may be the result of successful TB control activities and a
stable reduction of TB prevalence, but most evaluations have
argued that current funding is insufﬁcient to sustain the scale-up
of PPM in the long term and that more investment is urgently
needed.34,48,66,74 Therefore, the analysis of cost-effectiveness and
expenditure reduction is an increasing requirement.
Incentives, although not an essential condition, are always
thought to be a useful approach to improve PPM participation and
the service performance of physicians. Most TB care providers
participate in PPM programs with little or even no subsidy;
however, some have expressed that incentives are too few to
garner enthusiasm, thus they sometimes prescribe additional
drugs and tests for proﬁt. For example, in Ho Chi Minh City, small
incentives had little impact on case treatment and manage-
ment.74,75
With regard to patients, the provision of free tests and drugs for
TB has increased access to health care and has lowered treatment
expenditure. Some patients, however, have spent a lot on herbal
medicines or other home remedies that are not covered by the
Essential Medicine List (EML).105,106 Most studies did not report
patient costs or socioeconomic status, and fewer calculated
treatment costs in relation to the average patient income; it is
therefore difﬁcult to judge whether the total costs for patients have
been reduced by the implementation of PPM, and it is impossible to
estimate the proportion of costs saved attributable to improved
access.7
(2) Political commitment is essential; appraisals with subse-
quent rewards and punishments are necessary. Some PPMs have
involved physicians who have not complied with their duties
although they consented to perform them. In some programs,
private practitioners did not believe in the NTP regimens and the
referral system, and managed TB patients according to their own
judgment; further, they made proﬁts by keeping these patients and
prescribing extra drugs.76 Therefore, existing regulations need to
be enforced and rules of punishment should also be adopted to
stop any unethical behavior of private practitioners. In addition,
advocacy and standardized training are becoming increasingly
important in order to gain agreement on PPM DOTS and popularize
therapy guidelines. It could sometimes be made compulsory to
improve the knowledge, consciousness, and behavior of health
care providers; for example in the Bangladesh program, private
practitioners involved in the PPM are required to pass a
qualiﬁcation test, and incentives are provided after training
courses are completed and an exam is passed.54
(3) Better PPM governance is necessary for an effective
partnership. It may be essential to introduce a ‘door opener’ or
‘intermediary actor’ with sufﬁcient power between the NTP and
health sectors involved, to improve operational management.
NGOs, considered separately from the private health sector, take an
indispensable intermediary role in many successful PPM pro-
grams. NGOs often perform mobilization, training, and supervisionof the for-proﬁt health providers by building an NTP–NGO–private
link. Some NGOs, such as medical associations and charities, also
provide TB diagnosis and treatment services, which relieves the
stress on NTP facilities to some extent.10–12
(4) A lack of communication and growing mistrust between
partners are proposed as unseen barriers to PPM. For example in
Kerala, due to the limited resources and weak coordination, NGOs
and private practitioners at the district level actually had no formal
relationship with the NTP facilities, fueled by a lack of mutual
understanding among the different sectors.36 Regular meetings,
held by the relative stakeholders, would be helpful to enhance
inner linkages and address recent problems in the PPM process. In
addition, a supervision system consisting of skilled physicians and
research professionals would provide guidance and monitoring of
private practitioners.
Most PPM programs reported in this review belong to limited
district and short term pilots that are still ongoing. As a promising
strategy, PPMs should be encouraged to reach a multiple-region
level, or even a nationally signiﬁcant scale. Current evidence from
our ﬁndings suggests that the essential commonalities for scaling-
up PPMs may include the following: (1) sufﬁcient program funding
covering operational expenditure, drugs, materials, infrastructure
construction, subsidies, etc.; (2) policies, duties, reward/punish-
ment rules, and standard guidelines; (3) optimal means of
collaboration with integrated mechanisms, such as support
mechanisms plus contract and/or multi-partner group mecha-
nisms; (4) high-quality TB services, mainly regarding case
diagnosis, treatment, and management; (5) collaboration-promot-
ing approaches, including communication, coordination, supervi-
sion, and quality assessment; (6) measures to improve treatment
adherence of patients and dissemination of knowledge among the
general public.
4.2. Strengths and limitations
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the intervention
approach is somewhat limited. Therefore we performed the
present study through a rigorous systematic review by compre-
hensive search, meticulous screening, and in-depth analysis, which
is widely recognized as an effective way to compile powerful
evidence. Given the integrity and objectivity of the data included,
the results of our study may represent real and overall evidence in
the research ﬁeld. Another strength is the fact that we have
summarized three PPM collaboration mechanisms and have
cautiously abandoned the category of ‘model’ to adopt ‘mecha-
nism’, as we aimed to present our academic opinions without any
absolute judgment.
Some limitations should be underlined. Most of the studies
included were longitudinal studies, but many set no control arms,
and the rest were cross-sectional surveys. The inclusion of different
study types may lead to an increase in the heterogeneity of synthesis
results. Moreover, for many surveys, the outcome measure was not
primary data, making a quantitative meta-analysis potentially
X. Lei et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 34 (2015) 20–3230misleading. In addition, studies on some PPM programs, such as the
PPMs in Egypt and Congo,7,8 have been reported as literature
reviews; hence eligible data were insufﬁcient for extraction and
analysis. Finally, publication bias may exist since positive outcomes
of a PPM would be more encouraging, and this is difﬁcult to assess
without a quantitative analysis. In light of these limitations, our
ﬁndings should be interpreted with caution.
4.3. Conclusions
In summary, the results of this study revealed that the PPM
strategy has generally achieved the goals in TB care and control
in many countries; however in some countries, PPMs have not
performed very well. Multiple collaboration mechanisms, such
as signing contracts and establishing a multi-partner group,
are recommended to ensure positive PPM performance. In
addition, we would encourage the performance of studies
involving the long-term observation of patient cohorts with
control arms, whether compared to other interventions or
other study sites, in order to more comprehensively assess
PPM outcomes.
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